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I. Introduction
This survey article reviews the major EU competition law
developments in the pharmaceutical sector from 1 July
2014 through 31 October 2015 as well as decisions that
were adopted earlier but only published during the period.
The European Commission did not adopt any decisions
dealing with the pharmaceutical sector during this period,
but published its decisions in Lundbeck, Servier, and J&J/
Novartis, which provide a rich source of information on
how the Commission approaches IP, regulatory, and com-
mercial strategies that delay generic entry. National compe-
tition authorities continue to be active, notably in the area
of pricing and distribution/parallel trade.
II. Agreements hindering generic
competition
A. Reverse-payment patent settlements
Reverse-payment patent settlements remain a priority for
the Commission. In June 2013, it adopted its first decision
dealing with these settlements in Lundbeck, 1 and, in July
2014, it adopted its second such decision in Servier.2 Both
decisions are now on appeal to the General Court. The
various Lundbeck cases (Lundbeck and each of the generic
companies have appealed, and each appeal is treated as a
separate case) were argued in the fall of 2015, so it is likely
that the General Court will issue its judgments in the first
half of 2016. The Commission has at least one ongoing in-
vestigation, which involves a settlement agreement
between Cephalon and Teva.3 The UK Competition and
Markets Authority (CMA) has an ongoing investigation
concerning reverse-payment settlements between GlaxoS-
mithKline (GSK) and various generic manufacturers for
the anti-depressant drug paroxetine.4
The Lundbeck and Servier decisions are voluminous—
Lundbeck is 466 pages and Servier is 805 pages—and
contain a wealth of information on how the Commission
analyses reverse-payment settlements, on the more general
topic of the interplay between competition and IP laws,
on the definition of markets for drugs, and on the ap-
plication of Article 102 to late life cycle management
strategies. The length of these decisions is due in large
part to the fact that, after discussing issues common to
the various agreements between the originator and each
generic, the Commission must analyse each settlement
agreement separately. The length is also undoubtedly due
to the fact that the Commission drafted them with an eye
towards the likely appeals to the General Court—each
decision sets out the facts and the Commission’s rea-
soning in detail complete with explanatory footnotes,
which are at times more interesting than the actual text
of the decision.
In Lundbeck, the European Commission imposed
a fine of E93.8 million on Lundbeck, the Danish pharma-
ceutical company, and fines totalling E52.2 million on
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1 Case AT.39266, Lundbeck, Decision of 19 June 2013.
2 Case AT.39612, Servier, Decision of 9 July 2014.
3 ‘Commission Opens Investigation Against Pharmaceutical Companies
Cephalon and Teva’, European Commission Press Release IP/11/511 (28
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4 ‘OFT Issues Statement of Objections to Certain Pharmaceutical
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generic manufacturers Alpharma, Merck KGaA/Generics
UK, Arrow, and Ranbaxy. The agreements at issue involved
Lundbeck’s blockbuster anti-depressant citalopram. The
compound patent on the citalopram molecule had
expired, but Lundbeck still had various process patents.
Lundbeck entered into settlement agreements with the
generic manufacturers in which it made payments to
them, and they allegedly agreed not to enter the market
for the duration of the agreement and, in some cases,
agreed to destroy their stocks of generics.
The Commission’s analysis of the various agreements
focused on the following key points:
† Potential competition. In the Commission’s view, a
generic is a potential competitor as long as there has
not been a final ruling from a court on the patent as it
is free to enter the market and challenge the patent.5
The Commission rejected the argument raised by
Lundbeck and numerous generics that patents must
be presumed to be valid and, thus, the generic may
not be considered as a potential competitor because,
if it entered the market, it would violate the patent.
† Payment. According to the Commission, when a settle-
ment is made without a payment or other transfer of
value from the originator to the generic, it is unlikely
to raise competition concerns as the settlement likely
would be the result of the parties’ independent assess-
ments of the patent situation.6 In contrast, where there
is a payment, it may well be that it is the payment
rather than the patent that causes the generic to agree
not to enter the market for a certain period.7 The
Commission rejected the argument that the payment
may simply reflect an asymmetry of risk as between the
originator and the generics in that the originator has
much more to lose if the patent is struck down or held
not to be infringed.
† By object infringement. The Commission found that
the settlements constituted restrictions of competition
‘by object’ so that it was not necessary to establish
anticompetitive effects. As there are few issues in the
competition law field that have generated more debate
in the past few years than how reverse-payment settle-
ments should be analysed, and as the Commission has
no experience with such settlements, it would seem at
least questionable whether they should be treated as
‘by object’ restrictions that ‘by their very nature’ are
restrictive of competition, particularly in light of the
Court of Justice’s ruling in Cartes Bancaires,8 in which
it seemed to narrow the scope of the ‘by object’
restriction.
In Servier, the Commission imposed a fine ofE331 million
on Servier, the French pharmaceutical company, and fines
totalling E96 million on five generic manufacturers—
Unichem, Matrix (now Mylan), Teva, Krka, and Lupin.
The agreements involved Servier’s best-selling blood
pressure medicine, perindopril. Servier’s basic molecule
patents had expired in 2003, but it still held a number of
patents related to the manufacturing process and the
product’s formulation, which the Commission described
as ‘secondary’ patents. Generic manufacturers were chal-
lenging these patents before various courts and, at the
same time, preparing to enter the market.
The Commission’s decision in Servier differs from the
Lundbeck decision in two basic respects. First, while the
Commission only analysed the settlement agreements
under a ‘by object’ test in Lundbeck, it hedged its bets
and also applied an ‘effects’ test in Servier. As the Court
of Justice’s ruling in Cartes Bancaires, which came
several months after the decision in Servier, would not
seem to augur well for the Commission’s case because it
appears to narrow the scope of the ‘by object’ restriction,
this two-pronged strategy may turn out to be prescient.
Second, the Commission found that, in addition to
entering into agreements that restricted competition in
violation of Article 101, Servier’s conduct constituted an
abuse of its dominant position in violation of Article 102.
This is the first time that the Commission has applied
Article 102 to late life cycle management strategies since
its decision in AstraZeneca, and is therefore useful in
understanding its thinking. The Commission began its
analysis by emphasising that a strategy designed to
protect an originator’s market position against generic
entry is ‘generally legitimate to the extent it resorts to
measures representing competition on the merits’, which
it described as competition on product quality and the
strategic use of IPRs and the patent system.9 In contrast,
a dominant company’s use of measures that deviate from
competition on the merits and are capable of producing
foreclosure effects will be subject to antitrust scrutiny.
Applying these principles to Servier’s late life cycle
management strategy, the Commission found that
Servier had abused its dominant position by engaging
in a ‘single and continuous exclusionary strategy’ that
consisted of both acquiring technology that would have
allowed generic manufacturers to make a product that
did not infringe Servier’s process patents and the con-
5 Lundbeck, para. 624.
6 Ibid, para. 604.
7 Ibid.
8 Case C-67/13P, Groupement des Cartes Bancaires v European Commission
(11 September 2014) (not yet reported).
9 Servier, para. 2766.
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clusion of the settlement agreements.10 In finding that
these features of Servier’s strategy were abusive, the
Commission emphasised that they took place in the
context of a broader strategy aimed at curbing generic
entry that included the creation of a patent thicket and
efforts to convince regulators to adopt stricter product
specifications that favoured the Servier’s product. While
the Commission did not establish that these practices
contributed to foreclosure effects, it nevertheless found
them to be pertinent to its analysis insofar as they
explained why competition from generics was limited to
certain avenues that Servier then proceeded to shut off
through its acquisition of technology and the settlement
agreements.11 This approach seems inconsistent with the
Commission’s declaration that strategic use of patents is
generally not problematic and is disturbing in that it
seems to suggest that it will be easier to find that
conduct is abusive if it takes place in the context of an
entirely legitimate IP and regulatory strategy aimed at
combatting generic competition.
The abuse identified in Servier is interesting in that
the Commission went out of its way to construct an
abuse did not consist of a single action taken in isolation,
but rather was a combination of various activities—the
acquisition and the settlements. To link these activities,
the Commission borrowed the phrase ‘single and continu-
ous act’ so familiar in the context of its cartel decisions.12
It underscored that the technology acquisition and the
settlements were ‘intertwined’13 and ‘complementary’,14
forming a ‘clear pattern’15 of conduct where Servier tar-
geted potential entrants to remove the competitive threat.
In the Commission’s view, the technology acquisition
and the settlements were necessary complements to a suc-
cessful exclusionary strategy as they shut off the two prin-
ciple routes to market for generics—inventing around the
patented process or convincing a court to issue a finding
of invalidity or non-infringement.16
In concluding that the technology acquisition con-
tributed to the foreclosure effects of its single and con-
tinuous exclusionary strategy, the Commission found
that Servier did not acquire the technology to improve
its own production processes (as there was evidence that
Servier did not use the technology), but rather to re-
inforce its thicket of blocking patents.17 The Commis-
sion examined the technological landscape in some
detail and found that the technology acquired by Servier
was the most advanced in terms of potential to bring
a product to market and, thus, represented the most
immediate competitive threat to Servier. By acquiring
the technology, Servier eliminated this threat.
Turning to the settlements, the Commission found
that they fell outside of competition on the merits and
also contributed to the foreclosure effects of Servier’s
strategy. According to the Commission, Servier engaged in
unilateral abusive conduct by using the profits it reaped
in a market where it was dominant to buy off competi-
tors.18 The Commission highlighted that the settlements
were a ‘chain of agreements which were mutually re-
inforcing’19 and that they formed part of a pattern pur-
suant to which Servier ‘systematically targeted’ close
potential competitors.20
The Commission continues to monitor patent settle-
ments in the pharmaceutical sector. Each year, the Com-
mission requests originator and generic companies to
submit copies of all patent settlement agreements covering
EU/EEA markets concluded during the previous calendar
year together with related agreements. The principle aim
of this annual monitoring exercise is to identify reverse-
payment patent settlements and other settlements that
could delay generic entry, such as those that contain
restrictions extending beyond the geographic or material
scope of the patent.
As in the previous monitoring reports, the Fifth Mon-
itoring Report21 first discusses the main categories of
settlements and then provides an overview of the replies
submitted by companies and an analysis of the main
characteristics of the settlements falling within particular
categories. The Commission’s discussion of the categor-
ies of patent settlements in these reports is about the
only concrete guidance that companies have as to when
a settlement is likely to raise competition law concerns.
Perhaps reflecting an awareness that this report is viewed
as informal guidance, the Commission tends to use
exactly the same language each year. Indeed, the Fifth
Monitoring Report repeats the previous year’s report
verbatim except for the actual figures on the settlements.
After 5 years, the monitoring exercise has become
stale. It offers statistics that are of little use in under-
standing what is actually happening. For example, the
Fifth Report shows that the number of settlements has
10 Ibid, para. 2774.
11 Ibid, para. 2772.
12 Ibid, paras 2962, 2963, and footnote 3804.
13 Ibid, para. 2783.
14 Ibid, para. 2777.
15 Ibid, para. 2794.
16 Ibid.
17 Servier, para. 2776.
18 Ibid, para. 2933.
19 Ibid, para. 2942.
20 Ibid, para. 2945.
21 5th Report on the Monitoring of Patent Settlements (period: January–
December 2013) (5 December 2014).
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increased, a meaningless statistic unless it is compared
with the number of cases litigated, which the Report fails
to do. Other than the figures on how many settlements
fall into the various categories used to classify settlements,
the Report does not provide any detail concerning the set-
tlements that would be useful in understanding which
ones are most likely to raise concerns.
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the monitoring
report is that the categories used to classify settlements
in terms of the degree of competition law risk attached
to them provide little useful information and arguably
have a chilling effect on settlements that could be pro-
competitive to the extent that they would allow early
generic entry. These categories had their origin in the
Commission’s Report on the Pharmaceutical Sector
Inquiry, which is somewhat ironic given that, in this
Report, the Commission explicitly disavowed reaching
any conclusions concerning the application of competi-
tion law in the pharmaceutical sector.22 Settlements
falling in Category A and Category B.I are considered to
be generally unproblematic, which is not surprising as
Category A settlements are those that allow immediate
market entry by the generic and those in Category B.I
where there is no value transfer from the originator, ie
where the generic agrees to enter after patent expiry. It is
questionable whether settlements in these categories are
settlements at all in the sense that the one side or the
other has capitulated entirely.
Settlements falling in the remaining category—Category
B.II—that do not allow immediate entry by the generic
and involve a value transfer from the originator to the
generic are deemed the most likely to raise competition
law concerns. The problem with this category is that it
includes almost every form of settlement that would
seem to fall within the normal definition of the term
and, thus, risks discouraging companies from entering
into meaningful settlements at all, including those that
would allow early entry. For example, this category
includes a common form of settlement that would seem
to be benign in most circumstances: early entry by the
generic. The Commission itself admits that such settle-
ments are ‘not likely to attract the highest degree of anti-
trust scrutiny’.23 Instead of using such vague language, it
would be helpful if the Commission clearly stated that
such a settlement would be unlikely to raise concerns.
More generally, after 5 years of monitoring as well as
having adopted decisions in Lundbeck and Servier, it
would seem that the Commission has enough experience
under its belt that it could issue some form of guidance
to companies that puts meat on the bones of the sparse
guidance found in its monitoring reports.
In light of the strong views held by those on each side
of the debate on patent settlements, it would seem likely
that any ruling of the General Court would be appealed
to the Court of Justice, which means that it could be a
number of years before these issues are finally settled.
In the meantime, originators and generics enter into
reverse-payment settlements at their peril.
B. Co-promotion and co-marketing
agreements
While the Commission’s enforcement efforts have focussed
on reverse-payment patent settlements, it has made it clear
that other kinds of agreements that delay generic entry
may raise competition law concerns. On 10 December
2013, the Commission adopted a decision imposing fines
totalling E16 million on Johnson & Johnson (J&J) and
Novartis for entering into a co-promotion agreement that
had the object of delaying entry into the Dutch market of
a generic version of fentanyl, a painkiller used by cancer
patients.24 The Commission published its 147-page deci-
sion in this case on 5 March 2015.
J&J had developed fentanyl and had commercialised
it in different forms since the 1960s. By 2005, J&J’s
patent protection on the fentanyl depot patch had expired
in the Netherlands, and Novartis’s subsidiary Sandoz was
on the verge of launching a generic version of that patch.
However, Sandoz never launched the generic patch because,
in July 2005, it entered into a co-promotion agreement
with J&J’s subsidiary, Janssen-Cilag. Under this agree-
ment, Sandoz would co-promote a new version of J&J’s
fentanyl patch in exchange for monthly payments that
exceeded the profits that Sandoz expected to make from
the sale of generic patches. This agreement stayed in place
until December 2006, when a third party was about to
launch a generic version of the fentanyl depot patch.
The Commission found that the co-promotion ag-
reement harmed competition because it delayed the entry
of a cheaper generic fentanyl patch, leading to the main-
tenance of higher price levels in the Netherlands. The
Commission’s decision contains extensive documentary
evidence—emails, presentations, and notes—showing the
progression of the negotiations leading up to the settle-
22 Communication from Commission, Executive Summary of the
Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Report, p. 6 (8 July 2009). (‘It is important
to note underline that . . . [the report] does not identify individual cases of
wrongdoing or provide any guidance on the compatibility of the practices
examined with the EC competition rules.’)
23 5th Monitoring Report, para. 12.
24 Decision in Case AT.39685, Fentanyl (10 December 2015).
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ment and that the settlement’s goal was to prevent Sandoz
from entering the market with a generic that would erode
price levels. These documents included detailed financial
calculations showing that the amount of the payment was
intended to match what Sandoz would have lost by not
entering the market. The Commission also emphasised
that Sandoz engaged in very limited or no co-promotion
activities, which supported the Commission’s case that the
payment was in return for Sandoz’s agreement to stay off
the market during the period of the agreement.
While the Commission has described Fentanyl as a
‘pay-for-delay’ case, this description is misleading to the
extent that this suggests that it is comparable with a
reverse-payment settlement case. The payment did not
occur in the context of a patent settlement as did the pay-
ments in Lundbeck and Servier. In Fentanyl, the relevant
patent had already expired, so the case does not involve
the complex policy issues raised by the reverse-payment
settlement cases. Rather, it appears to be a more straight-
forward case involving market sharing by competitors.
The case highlights the need for pharmaceutical com-
panies to exercise caution when entering into agreements
with competitors or potential competitors, particularly
when such agreements enter into force around the
time that a product is going off patent so that a generic
could enter the market. While Novartis/J&J dealt with a
co-promotion agreement, a similar analysis could apply
in the case of, for instance, an ‘authorised generic’ agree-
ment where the originator grants the generic a license to
sell the original product rather than entering with its
own generic version.
C. Denigration
On 18 December 2014, the Paris Court of Appeal issued a
judgment upholding a May 2013 decision of the French
competition authority (FCA), which found that Sanofi-
Aventis had abused its dominant position by denigrating
generic versions of its blockbuster Plavix, and imposed a
fine of E40.6 million.25 The FCA found that Sanofi-
Aventis had engaged in a marketing campaign that system-
atically discouraged the use of generic versions of Plavix by
highlighting that they used different salts from the original
version and that they were not indicated for use in com-
bination with aspirin for acute coronary syndrome.
On appeal, Sanofi-Aventis argued that, as a drug
manufacturer, it has a duty to provide information and
counselling to doctors and pharmacists, and that it ful-
filled this obligation by providing complete and precise
information about the objective characteristics of the
products. The Court rejected this argument, holding that
the problem was not the information communicated, but
how Sanofi-Aventis communicated it. The Court noted
that the differences highlighted between the Sanofi-
Aventis product and the generic versions did not affect
their therapeutic substitutability, and were simply the
result of Sanofi-Aventis’s patents over certain salts. While
Sanofi-Aventis did not claim that the use of different salts
could affect the efficacy or safety of a generic, the Court
held that Sanofi-Aventis implied as much, which created
doubts concerning generics. Further, Sanofi’s representa-
tives encouraged doctors to write ‘non-substitutable’ on
prescriptions and advised pharmacists to only substitute
with Sanofi’s own generic clopidogrel.
In assessing the FCA’s decision that such practices
constituted an abuse, the Court of Appeal recalled that
the language of Article 102 is broad, which means that a
wide range of practices, including denigrating actual or
potential competitors, may constitute an abuse of a
dominant position. It then looked at the pharmaceutical
sector, noting that doctors and pharmacists are reluctant
to change their prescribing habits and are risk averse.
Thus, any dissemination of negative information or in-
sinuation that a generic product may present risk will be
sufficient to convince doctors not to prescribe it and
pharmacists not to provide it to the patient when given a
choice. The Court thus agreed with the FCA’s conclusion
that diffusing information that is incomplete, ambiguous,
or presented in such a way as to suggest that generics sub-
stitution could create a therapeutic risk constitutes an
abuse in violation of Article 102.
The Court of Appeal’s judgment confirms that origina-
tors need to be careful in raising concerns about generics,
as marketing campaign may be held to be abusive if it
creates unsubstantiated doubt in the minds of doctors
and pharmacists about the quality of the generic.
Sanofi-Aventis has appealed this judgment to the
French Supreme Court, and the judgment is pending.
The FCA is investigating similar allegations against
Janssen-Cilag for denigrating a generic producer for com-
peting against its Durogesic painkiller, as well as granting
discounts to hospitals.26
III. Pricing
Competition authorities have continued to investigate
pricing strategies of innovative pharmaceutical companies,
leading to important developments on discount/rebate
strategies, special hospital discounts, and allegations of
excessive pricing.
25 Paris Court of Appeal, Case No. 2013/12370 (18 December 2014). 26 ‘French Antitrust Authority to Rule on Janssen Cilag Generic Defamation
Case in 2014’, MLex (23 January 2014).
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In June 2015, the UKCMA announced that it had issued
a warning letter to an unnamed pharmaceutical company
concerning a suspected loyalty-inducing discount scheme,
though it closed the case on administrative priority
grounds.27 While the CMA’s announcement does not
provide details of the scheme or reach any decision on
whether the scheme infringed competition law, it never-
theless provides guidance on the types of rebates and dis-
counts that may cause competition concerns. The CMA
indicated that schemes are more likely to give rise to
competition concerns where the rebates or discounts:
† are conditional on the customer obtaining all or most
of its requirements from the dominant company;
† are retroactive (ie only apply if the customer reaches a
volume threshold, and trigger lower prices on units
above and below the threshold), especially if the cus-
tomer may wish to source some (but not all) of its
demand from a competitor;
† result in below-cost prices for contestable sales (ie the
sales for which another supplier could compete); or
† result in negative incremental pricing (ie if the cus-
tomer purchases more from the dominant company,
then the total price paid by the customer goes down).
While the CMA identified the above types of rebates as
increasing the competition law risks, it noted that it will
consider ‘all of the circumstances’, and thus any assess-
ment of whether discounts or rebates violate competi-
tion law will necessarily be fact specific.
This announcement by the CMA is broadly in line
with the recent case law of the EU Courts, including
Intel28 and Post Danmark II,29 pursuant to which exclu-
sivity and retroactive rebates or discounts will give rise to
a high risk of violating EU competition law. For other
forms of rebates and discounts, the CMA’s guidance indi-
cates, in line with the European Commission’s Article 102
Guidance, that they will give rise to less risk if the domin-
ant supplier’s net effective price for the contestable sales is
above the supplier’s long-run average incremental costs.
In light of the CMA’s guidance, dominant pharmaceut-
ical suppliers would be well advised to avoid exclusivity
and retroactive rebates, absent special circumstances, and
should also ensure that any volume discounts or rebates
do not decrease the net effective prices of its products to a
level that is below cost.
B. Hospital discounts
In December 2014, the Dutch Consumers and Markets
Authority announced the closure of its investigation into
AstraZeneca, concerning allegations that AstraZeneca
was selling its product Nexium below cost to hospitals in
order to increase prescriptions and sales in the commu-
nity (eg in pharmacies) at higher prices.30 Such allega-
tions bear strong similarities to the activities sanctioned
by the UK competition authority in its 2001 decision in
Napp Pharmaceuticals. In public statements, a member
of the Dutch Authority has indicated that it considers
such a strategy of discounting to hospitals to be problem-
atic, as it allegedly reduces the substitution by cheaper
generic equivalents.31
However, the Dutch Authority closed the case without
reaching any conclusion, as it did not find that AstraZe-
neca was dominant either on the hospital market or in the
community market. Initially, the view of the Authority was
that the relevant community market should be defined
very narrowly to only include Nexium, and exclude gener-
ics, as patients were thought to be bound to use Nexium
due to the initial prescription in the hospital. However,
AstraZeneca was able to refute this theory by presenting
evidence of substitution, so there was no dominant pos-
ition on which to base a case.
C. Excessive pricing
Despite the often strong public and governmental pres-
sure to pursue pharmaceutical suppliers for excessive
pricing, competition authorities are generally reluctant
to launch such cases because they raise very difficult
questions (eg what is the correct price), they may chill
innovation, and they are generally unnecessary in light
of the strong buyer power exercised by national health
authorities and other payors.
For example, in December 2014, the European Com-
mission declined to open an investigation into allega-
tions of excessive prices for Hepatitis C drugs, despite
pressure from members of the European Parliament. In
response to two parliamentary questions, the Commis-
sion noted that Member States have both economic
27 See Competition and Markets Authority, Statement regarding the CMA’s
decision to close an investigation into a suspected breach of competition law in
the pharmaceutical sector on the grounds of administrative priority (26 June
2015).
28 Judgment of the General Court, Case T-286/09, Intel v Commission (12
June 2014).
29 Judgment of the Court of Justice, Case C-23/14, Post Danmark v
Konkurrencera˚det (6 October 2015).
30 See ‘ACM closes investigation into AstraZeneca’, ACM Press Release
(2 December 2014).
31 Speech, Anita Vegter, Member of the Board of the Netherlands Consumers
and Markets Authority, UNCTAD, Geneva (8 July 2015), available at
,https://www.acm.nl/nl/publicaties/publicatie/14483/Speech-Anita-
Vegter-UNCTAD-8-juli-2015-Pharmaceutical-markets-and-consumers/.,
last accessed 15 November 2015.
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bargaining power and regulatory powers to control the
prices of pharmaceutical products, and that such powers
were being used to limit the prices of the Hepatitis C
drugs.32 The Commission appeared to acknowledge the
market dynamics that typify the pharmaceutical sector
in which national health authorities and insurance funds
exercise significant buyer power that limits the scope for
pharmaceutical suppliers to charge excessive prices.
Where such buyer power does not exist, however, and
pharmaceutical suppliers attempt to significantly in-
crease the prices of their medicines above the established
prices, the competition authorities may step in to investi-
gate, as illustrated by ongoing cases in the UK and Italy. On
6 August 2015, the UK CMA issued a statement of objec-
tions to Pfizer and Flynn Pharma concerning allegations of
excessive pricing for an anti-epilepsy drug.33 According to
the CMA, prior to 2012, Pfizer manufactured and mar-
keted the drug under the brand name Epanutin. Pfizer
then transferred the UK marketing rights to Flynn Pharma,
which ‘genericised’ the drug and started selling it in Sep-
tember 2012 at prices alleged to be 25–27 times higher
than Pfizer’s historical prices. The statement of objections
covers both Pfizer’s supply prices to Flynn Pharma and
Flynn Pharma’s prices to the market. This case is ongoing.
In a similar case, on 27 November 2014, the Italian
competition authority (ICA) launched an investigation
into allegations that Aspen Pharma abused its dominant
market position by increasing the price of its cancer
medications from 250 to 1,500 per cent.34 According to
the authority, Aspen had made efforts to increase the
prices in Italy up to the levels in other EU countries, in
order to limit the levels of parallel trade of the product
out of Italy. The authority also alleges that Aspen threa-
tened to withdraw the marketing authorisation of the
product if the health authority did not agree to the price
increases. This case is also ongoing.
IV. Licensing agreements between
competitors
The alleged attempt by Roche and Novartis to limit
competition between two products by preventing the
off-label use of one of them has led to fines in Italy and
is under investigation in other Member States. On 27
February 2014, the ICA imposed a fine of E92 million
on the Novartis group and E90.6 million on the Roche
group,35 and the Italian health authority is seeking
damages of around E1.2 billion for the increased prices
that it had to pay due to the agreement. The parties
appealed the ICA’s decision, which the Regional Court of
Lazio upheld in a judgment issued on 5 November 2014
that is discussed below.36 This judgment is on appeal to
the Italian Council of State.
Shortly after the ICA announced its decision, the FCA
opened an investigation into the same practices by Novar-
tis and Roche on the French market.37 It is reported that
consumer organisations have filed complaints in other
Member States, including Belgium, Spain, and Portugal.38
The Commission has not opened a case at the EU level,
but says that it is ‘gathering more information and is in
close contact with NCAs, notably with the French NCA,
which has conducted inspections at the premises of some
of the companies involved’.39
The case involved two drugs developed by Genentech
that came out of a research programme aimed at finding
ways to stop the process of blood vessel formation called
angiogenesis, which feeds tumour growth in cancer
patients and also causes certain eye diseases. The first
drug to be developed was Avastin, which was designed to
treat cancer. A couple of years later, a derivative of the
main compound in Avastin was developed into Lucentis,
a drug to treat eye disease. Before Lucentis came onto
the market, doctors used Avastin on an ‘off-label’ basis
to treat eye disease as well. In other words, even though
Avastin was only approved for the treatment of cancer,
doctors also prescribed it for treating the eye disease, an
unregistered or ‘off-label’ use.
As Genentech did not have a sales network in Europe,
it licensed the products out—Avastin to Roche, its
parent company, and Lucentis to Novartis. Avastin was
sold at a maximum price of E81 per injection in Italy,
while Lucentis was much more expensive—it started at a
price E1,700 per injection, which was later lowered to
E900. Before Lucentis was launched on the Italian
market, Avastin was widely prescribed by doctors on an
‘off-label’ basis to treat eye disease. The Italian regulatory
regime allowed such off-label use of a drug if there was
no registered treatment available. Once Lucentis was
launched on the Italian market, the off-label use of
Avastin for eye disease was no longer reimbursed
32 European Commission, Response to Parliamentary Question P-008636/
2014, 22 December 2014, and Response to Parliamentary Question E-
000261-15 (31 March 2015).
33 ‘CMA Issues statement of objections to Pfizer and Flynn Pharma in anti-
epilepsy drug investigation’, CMA Press Release (6 August 2015).
34 See ‘Antitrust’s Investigation on the Price Increase for Aspen’s Anticancer
Drugs’, ICA Press Release (27 November 2014).
35 Decision No. 24823 of 27 February 2014.
36 Regional Administrative Court (TAR) of Lazio, Judgment No. 6122 of 2014
(2 December 2014).
37 ‘Roche, Novartis Face French Antitrust Probe Over Eye Drugs’, Law 360, 10
April 2014.
38 See Test Achats, Press Release (26 November 2014).
39 Answer given by Commissioner Vestager to Parliamentary Question No. P-
000937-15 (20 February 2015).
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because there was now a drug available that was regis-
tered for the treatment of eye disease. The switch from
Avastin to Lucentis for the treatment of eye disease led to
a dramatic increase in the cost of treating the eye disease,
which generated the complaints by private healthcare
clinics and the Italian Ophthalmological Society that led
the ICA to open its investigation.
After a year-long investigation, the ICA concluded that
Roche and Novartis had colluded to prevent Avastin from
being used for the treatment of eye disease. More specifical-
ly, they had carried out a campaign aimed at artificially dif-
ferentiating Avastin and Lucentis by raising safety concerns
about the off-label use of Avastin to treat eye disease. The
ICA found numerous communications between the two
groups to this effect, particularly between the managers of
their respective Italian subsidiaries, as well as internal docu-
ments discussing this strategy. It also pointed out that
Roche had sought a change to the label of Avastin high-
lighting the risks of using Avastin to treat eye disease. The
two companies also sought to downplay independent
studies showing that the two drugs were equivalent. The
ICA emphasised that Roche had an economic incentive to
prevent Avastin from being used off label to treat eye
disease because, as Genentech’s parent company, it stood to
gain more from the royalties paid to Genentech by Novar-
tis for sales of Lucentis than from sales of Avastin.
In their appeal against the ICA’s decision, Roche and
Novartis argued that the restrictions on the off-label use
of Avastin were the result of the decision of the Italian
regulatory authority and were not caused by an illegal
agreement. The evaluations carried out by the Italian
and EU regulatory authorities indicated that Lucentis
and Avastin are not equivalent for the purpose of treat-
ing eye disease. Roche and Novartis also emphasised that
the systematic off-label use of drugs is unlawful, particu-
larly in a situation where a drug has been approved for
the same therapeutic indication. In short, it would have
been unlawful to sell Avastin for the eye treatment under
the relevant regulatory rules.
The Lazio Regional Court rejected these arguments
and upheld the ICA’s decision. It easily—perhaps too
easily—brushed aside the regulatory arguments raised
by Roche and Novartis by finding that they were outside
the scope of its competence and, thus, not relevant to its
review of the decision. It then proceeded to find that
Avastin and Lucentis were competing products as
Avastin was used off-label to treat eye disease in compe-
tition with Lucentis. Finally, it found that Roche and
Novartis had entered into an illegal agreement to
prevent Avastin from being used in competition with
Lucentis, pointing to evidence in the file of communica-
tions to this effect between the parties.
This judgment is troubling in that the court failed to
deal with one of the key issues raised by this case: how to
reconcile the tension between the regulatory and compe-
tition law regimes. If it is illegal to systematically promote
the off-label use of a product, it seems difficult to argue
that an agreement that is aimed at preventing such off-
label use is restrictive of competition.
The parties do not appear to have raised the argument
that the ICA’s decision is arguably at odds with the compe-
tition law regime governing the licensing of intellectual
property rights in that it raises doubts about the ability of
pharmaceutical companies to license out their rights for
specific fields of use. In this case, Roche’s subsidiary, Gen-
entech developed Avastin and Lucentis. Roche decided to
license Lucentis out to Novartis for the treatment of eye
disease and to commercialise Avastin itself for the treat-
ment of cancer. Under the Technology Transfer Guidelines,
the restriction on the sale of Lucentis and Avastin outside
of their intended therapeutic areas could have been
achieved by placing field-of-use restrictions in the licence
agreement.40 Indeed, field-of-use restrictions are pro-com-
petitive to the extent that they encourage the dissemination
of technology by allowing a licensor to use its technology
for one use and to license it out for another.
The ICA treated the relationship between Roche and
Novartis as a horizontal relationship between competi-
tors, but there was no evidence whatsoever that, absent
the license, Novartis would have competed with Roche.
Thus, it is only because of the license that Novartis was a
competitor. In these circumstances, the ICA’s treatment
of communications between the parties as illegal collu-
sion would seem misplaced as they were in a vertical re-
lationship of licensor and licensee. However, the ICA
gave short shrift to the parties’ arguments that the rela-
tionship was vertical, pointing to an e-mail from Novar-
tis in which it stated that there was no contractual basis
for preventing the off-label use of Avastin, which sug-
gested that there was no field-of-use restriction in the
license agreement. However, even if the agreement had
contained such a restriction, it remains an open question
whether the ICA would have taken a different approach.
The case serves as a warning to companies to be careful
in structuring licensing arrangements and to include
field-of-use restrictions where a drug can have different
40 Guidelines on the application of Article 101 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union to technology transfer agreements, OJ
(2014) C89/3 (‘Guidelines’), para. 212.
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indications. It also highlights that, even where a license
agreement exists, competition law may still limit the
extent to which a licensor and a licensee may collaborate.
V. Licensing: royalties on an invalid
patent
In the context of ongoing litigation between Genentech
and Hoechst, on 9 December 2014, the Paris Court of
Appeal referred a question to the EU Court of Justice con-
cerning whether EU competition law prohibits the en-
forcement of a royalty provision in a license agreement
where the licensed patent has been held to be invalid.41
The question arose in the midst of a long-running dispute
relating to a 1992 licensing agreement covering two US
patents and one European patent, the latter having been
revoked in 1999. The license agreement allowed Genen-
tech to use the licensed technology for research purposes
for an annual licensing fee and a royalty on the manufac-
ture, use, and sale of the licensed products.
According to Hoechst, Genentech never paid the
required royalties. On 27 October 2008, Hoechst notified
Genentech that it believed that Genentech was selling pro-
ducts that infringed the licensed patents. Shortly there-
after, Genentech terminated the agreement. Hoechst
initiated arbitration proceedings in Europe, seeking the
payment of royalties relating to the sale of the drug
Rituxan. The arbitral tribunal found in favour of Hoechst
and ordered Genentech to pay more thanE100 million in
damages. The arbitral award emphasised that the parties
had foreseen that, as long the agreement was in force, roy-
alties would be due for the manufacture of Rituxan, even
if the patent were later to be held invalid.
On appeal, Genentech argued that, according to EU case
law, it is contrary to European competition law to pay roy-
alties on an invalid patent, as it imposes unjustified
expenses on the licensee for a technology that is unpatent-
ed, thus placing the licensee at a competitive disadvantage.
The Paris Court of Appeal referred a question to the EU
Court of Justice, asking whether ‘the provisions of Article
101 of the TFEU must be interpreted as precluding effect
being given, where patents are revoked, to a licence agree-
ment which requires the licensee to pay royalties for the
sole use of the rights attached to the licensed patent’.
At present, the European Commission takes the pos-
ition in its Technology Transfer Guidelines that the parties
can normally agree to extend royalty payments beyond the
period of the licensed patent.42 While this may mean that
the licensee will be subject to higher costs after patent
expiry than others who are using the technology, it also
gives the parties more freedom in structuring the license,
which could foster the dissemination of the technology.
VI. Agreements relating to public
tenders
The ICA investigated a co-marketing agreement between
Novartis and Italfarmco after various regional health au-
thorities filed complaints concerning alleged collusive be-
haviour between them in the context of various tenders
for cancer drugs. It was alleged that they abstained from
participating in tenders in which the other was also par-
ticipating or else they only participated via a joint bid.
The investigation eventually focussed on the co-marketing
agreement between Novartis and Italfarmco pursuant to
which Italfarmco sold the product supplied by Novartis
under a different brand. The ICA found that certain fea-
tures of the agreement were problematic: it called for the
exchange of information between the parties on matters
such as quantities sold, promotional expenditures, and
medical information; it gave Novartis control over Ital-
farmco’s promotional strategy; it imposed a non-compete
obligation on Italfarmco; and Italfarmco committed to
achieve a minimummarket share.
In its decision of 30 June 2015,43 the ICA closed the
investigation on the basis of commitments offered by the
parties that addressed these concerns. The parties agreed
to limit the exchange of information to data strictly neces-
sary for the co-marketing, Novartis relinquished control
over Italfarmco’s promotional strategy and the obligation
on Italfarmco to achieve a minimum market share was
removed. Interestingly, the commitments did not cover
the non-compete clause, which presumably was consid-
ered integral to the co-marketing arrangement.
This decision highlights the somewhat schizophrenic
treatment of co-marketing agreements under competition
law. On the one hand, they are recognised as bringing
more competition to the market than would otherwise be
the case. On the other hand, the parties must be careful to
ensure that they operate independently on the market.
VII. Distribution and parallel trade
While there have not been any significant developments
at the EU level, ongoing cases, investigations, and legisla-
tive initiatives at the national level illustrate that the
legality of measures to limit parallel trade remain an un-
resolved issue in the pharmaceuticals industry.
41 Genentech, Inc. v Hoechst GmbH, formerly Hoechst AG, Sanofi-Aventis
Deutschland GmbH, Case C-567/14 (9 December 2014).
42 Guidelines, para. 187.
43 ARCA/Novartis-Italfarmco, Decision No. 24770.
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This seemingly never-ending line of parallel trade
cases in the industry is due in large part to the fact
that parallel trade has differing effects on different EU
Member States, with higher-priced countries receiving
benefits from the parallel trade of lower-priced medi-
cines, but with lower-priced countries facing disadvan-
tages such as shortages,44 higher prices,45 and decreased
intra-brand competition.46
The conflicting effects of parallel trade were the basis
for the compromise position adopted by the Court of
Justice in the GSK Greece case.47 In that case, the Court
noted that parallel trade increases competition in higher-
income Member States, where parallel trade represents an
alternate source of supply at lower prices.48 But the Court
also found that unrestricted parallel trade could have
harmful effects on lower-income countries, as pharma-
ceutical companies might be forced to cease supplying
medicines to such countries at lower prices that under-
mine their profits in higher-income countries.49 In light of
these conflicting effects, the Court adopted a compromise,
whereby pharmaceuticals companies may not block all
parallel trade, but may take reasonable and proportionate
measures in relation to the threat that parallel exports re-
present to their legitimate commercial interests.50
In the wake of the Court of Justice’s judgment, many
open questions remain, including issues such as the le-
gality of dual pricing systems in countries such as Spain,
as well as how pharmaceutical suppliers may implement
supply quotas to limit parallel trade without also hinder-
ing competition on the local market.
A. Spain: Pfizer
The uncertainty concerning what restrictions are allow-
able is well illustrated by the ongoing case against Pfizer
in Spain, which, after 10 years, is now largely back where
it started, with the Spanish competition authority inves-
tigating allegations that Pfizer’s wholesale distribution
agreements restricted parallel trade.
This case began back in 2005, when a Spanish whole-
saler complained to the European Commission, alleging
that Pfizer’s wholesale agreements sought to limit paral-
lel trade. The complaint alleged that Pfizer implemented
a system of dual pricing, whereby it charged lower prices
for products destined for use in the Spanish health
system, and higher prices for other sales, including those
destined for export to other countries.
The Commission referred the case to the Spanish
competition authority, noting that the complaint against
Pfizer bore similarities to the ongoing case against GSK
before the EU courts.51 In that case, the Commission had
decided that GSK’s dual pricing had the object and effect
of restricting competition in violation of Article 101(1),52
and these findings were ultimately upheld in the October
2009 judgment of the Court of Justice.53
Following the referral by the Commission, the Spanish
competition authority came to the opposite conclusion in
its 2009 decision, in which it dismissed the complaint and
decided that Pfizer’s agreements did not violate Article
101(1)54 because Pfizer did not actually set two prices,
but rather only charged one (higher) price, and the lower
price was charged only because of the applicable Spanish
pricing laws. The authority explained that Spanish pricing
laws establish a specific price only for those medicines
funded by the State and intended to be marketed within
Spain. In contrast, the price of medicines, whether or not
funded by the State, that are intended to be marketed
outside Spain, were freely set by Pfizer.
This decision by the Spanish competition authority was
surprising, as the authority departed from the reasoning
of the EU Courts in the case against GSK, and came to the
opposite result. These opposite results in very similar cases
may be explained by the differing effects of parallel trade,
and the reluctance of national authorities in lower-income
Member States to prohibit restrictions on parallel trade
that are likely to have beneficial effects for their local
healthcare system.
44 Ibid at para. 68.
45 Pharmaceutical suppliers may refuse to agree to offer lower prices if
significant volumes of the products will be resold into higher-price
markets. The net effect of this is that the lower-income countries may not
be able to afford as many treatments for their citizens.
46 Consistent with the judgment in GSK Greece, pharmaceutical suppliers
implement supply quotas in order to limit parallel trade into higher-priced
countries. However, these supply quotas also have the effect of limiting
competition among wholesalers in the local market, because wholesalers
will have little incentive to compete for new customers if they are not able
to increase their level of supplies.
47 Case C 468/06, Sot. Le´los kai Sia and Others v GlaxoSmithKline AEVE
Farmakeftikon Proı¨onton, EU:C:2008:504.
48 Ibid at paras 52–57.
49 Ibid at para. 68.
50 Ibid at paras 69–71.
51 Case T-168/01, GlaxoSmithKline Services v Commission, EU:T:2006:265 and
Case C-515/06 P, EAEPC v GlaxoSmithKline, EU:C:2008:738.
52 Commission Decision of 8 May 2001 relating to a proceeding pursuant to
Article 81 of the EC Treaty Cases: IV/36.957/F3 Glaxo Wellcome
(notification), IV/36.997/F3 Aseprofar and Fedifar (complaint), IV/37.121/
F3 Spain Pharma (complaint), IV/37.138/F3 BAI (complaint), and IV/
37.380/F3 EAEPC (complaint).
53 The EU Court of Justice did, however, hold that the Commission failed to
adequately consider GSK’s arguments for an exemption under Article
101(3), with the result that the. Following the judgment, the Decision of
the Commission was annulled and GSKwithdrew the application for an
individual exemption. The Commission confirmed in 2014 that GSK has
never reinstated its dual-pricing scheme in Spain. See Glaxo Wellcome,
Case 36957, Rejection Decision (23 September 2014).
54 Decision of the Spanish Competition Authority of 21 May 2009 on Case
2623/05, Spain Pharma.
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In light of the conflict between the decision of the
Spanish competition authority in Pfizer and the judg-
ment of the EU Courts in GSK, it is not surprising that
the complaining wholesaler appealed the decision to the
Spanish courts. The Spanish courts agreed with its
claims, first in a 2011 judgment by the national court,55
and then in a December 2014 judgment of the Spanish
Supreme Court. In the judgments, the Spanish courts held,
consistent with the EU Courts, that Pfizer’s agreements
were subject to Article 101(1), despite the national price reg-
ulations, and that the provisions contained therein imple-
menting dual pricing could potentially have the object or
effect of harming competition. Thus, the Supreme Court
annulled the decision and referred the case back to the
Spanish competition authority to assess whether Pfizer’s
agreements had the object or effect of restricting competi-
tion, in line with the case law of the EU Courts.
Following the judgments, in March 2015, the Spanish
competition authority opened a formal investigation of
Pfizer’s distribution practices in Spain. This investigation
is ongoing. The difficulty that will be faced by the
Spanish competition authority in this case will be to arrive
at a compromise position that addresses the differing
effects of parallel trade, as ultimately achieved by the
Court of Justice in the GSK Greece case. As in that case,
there is a need to balance any possible negative effects of
restrictions on parallel trade, with the benefits of the
restrictions, such as protecting the Spanish healthcare
system against medicine shortages and higher prices, and
ensuring that pharmaceutical suppliers are able to invest in
the research and development of new medicines. However,
unlike the quotas at issue in the GSK Greece case, there
would not seem any ready means to achieve such a com-
promise with respect to dual pricing.
B. Spain: European Commission investigation
In January 2012, the European Commission opened an
investigation into the pricing and distribution of medi-
cines in Spain, explaining that it is investigating ‘current
parallel trade and dual pricing issues in Spain more gener-
ally, including pricing practices implemented by companies
other than GSK’.56 While there have been no public
reports of recent activity related to this investigation, a re-
sponse by the Commission of August 2015 to a Parlia-
mentary Question indicates that the investigation remains
ongoing.57 Thus, it cannot be excluded that the Commis-
sion might again take a proactive role in attempting to
define what restrictions on parallel trade are allowable.
C. Romania: GlaxoSmithKline (GSK)
In Romania, a case against GSK has also been in progress
since 2013, but now may be close to resolution. In Septem-
ber 2015, the Romanian competition authority published
draft commitments submitted by GSK aimed at resolving
allegations that GSK’s distribution system harmed compe-
tition on the Romanian market and restricted parallel trade
in violation of Romanian and EU competition laws.58
The case arose following complaints by wholesalers
against GSK’s restructuring of its distribution system for
some of its products, pursuant to which it ceased sales to
independent wholesalers and instead implemented a
direct-to-pharmacy system, under which it sold its pro-
ducts directly to pharmacies up to supply quotas set for
individual pharmacies as well as for the Romanian market
as a whole.
In the context of the authority’s 2013–2014 sector
inquiry into the distribution of medicines, the authority
initially found that GSK’s restructuring from four to only
one wholesaler resulted in less competition, with the
result that discounts were no longer offered by wholesa-
lers to pharmacies.59 The authority thereafter launched a
specific investigation into allegations that GSK’s actions
constituted a potential abuse of a dominant position with
respect to GSK’s products Avodart and Seretide.
In order to resolve the investigation without any ac-
knowledgment of an infringement, GSK has offered
commitments, pursuant to which it commit to supply
products sufficient to meet the demands of the Roma-
nian market (based on IMS data), plus a safety margin
and buffer. These products would be supplied to at least
three independent wholesalers in parallel with GSK’s
own direct-to-pharmacy sales channel. The volumes sold
to independent wholesalers will be depending upon
the preferences expressed in a survey of pharmacies, in
which each pharmacy may select its desired distribution
channel. The decision of the competition authority on
whether to accept these commitments is still pending.
D. Poland, Bulgaria, and Slovakia: regulations
limiting parallel trade
Due to the problems caused by the export of medicines
from lower-income countries, governments in these
55 Judgment of the Audiencia Nacional (13 June 2011).
56 See Case 36957, Glaxo Wellcome (27 May 2014), reporting details of its
ongoing investigations in Spain.
57 See Response of the European Commission to Parliamentary Question E-
008304/2015 (27 August 2015).
58 See ‘The Competition Council launches for public debates the
commitments formulated by S.C. GLAXOSMITHKLINE S.R.L.’, Romanian
Competition Council Press Release (9 September 2015).
59 See ‘Use of the medicines limited distribution system has reduced the level
of discounts transferred to pharmacies’, Romanian Competition Council
Press Release (April 2014).
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countries have adopted additional measures to limit par-
allel trade. For example, on 7 May 2015, the Polish gov-
ernment adopted changes to its pharmaceutical laws to
control parallel trade by monitoring stock levels, identi-
fying potential shortages, and limiting exports where
shortages exist. These measures are similar to the mea-
sures implemented in Bulgaria in January 2014.
In the notification of these measures to the European
Commission,60 the Polish government provided the fol-
lowing justification for the resulting restrictions on the free
movement of goods: ‘The life and health of Polish patients
is at risk due to the lack on the Polish pharmaceutical
market of many medicinal products of therapeutic value.
The absence of these products stems from excess export,
brought about by the significantly lower prices of medicin-
al products in Poland, primarily of refunded products, in
comparison to prices in other EUMember States.’
Despite the compelling interest of governments to
control parallel trade, such measures are not immune to
challenge. In a judgment of January 2015, the Bulgarian
constitutional court annulled the system set up by the
Bulgarian government to prevent exports, as it found the
measures adopted to be disproportionate. In addition,
the European Commission has issued a formal letter of
notice to Slovakia relating to allegations that measures
requiring wholesalers to notify exports do not comply
with the EU Treaties.61 These actions illustrate that, even
when measures are adopted by national governments,
significant uncertainty remains concerning the extent to
which parallel trade may be restricted.
VI. Sector inquiries
There have been a number of sector inquiries conducted
or completed by national competition authorities in the
past year, analysing competition among innovative
pharmaceutical suppliers, wholesalers, and pharmacies.
In Italy, the ICA launched a sector inquiry on 27 May
2015 into the market for human vaccines, which costs
the Italian health system represent over E300 million
per year.62 The sector inquiry is aimed at increasing
competition in the sector, apparently by investigating
possible improvements to the public tender procedures
to improve the buying power of the payors, and also in-
vestigating possible obstacles to competition implemen-
ted by vaccine suppliers in violation of the Italian and
EU competition laws. Past cases in other EU countries in
the vaccine sector indicate that potential issues that will
likely be investigated include collusive tendering among
suppliers and abusive bundling practices.
In connection with the sector inquiry, the ICA opened
a public consultation, which closed on 10 July 2015.
In Lithuania, the national competition authority ini-
tiated a sector inquiry in May 2015 into the market for re-
imbursable medicine, assessing the competitive effect of
pricelist restrictions.63 The decision points out that the
market for reimbursable drugs is important for consumers.
The inquiry aims at conducting a detailed analysis of the
market and identifying potential competition issues. The
inquiry follows a 2013 inquiry focussed on parallel trade.
Finally, with respect to competition at the wholesale
and pharmacy levels, the national competition author-
ities in Denmark64 and Spain65 conducted sector inquir-
ies in the last year. In Poland,66 the national competition
authority announced the results of its sector into the
retail pharmaceutical market, noting that, since the be-
ginning of 2014, the number of pharmacies run by phar-
macy chains has increased by 30 per cent.
VII. Conclusion
The past year may be a lull before the storm in terms of en-
forcement activity at the EU level. The European Commis-
sion seems to be waiting for the General Court’s judgments
in Lundbeck and Servier before pursuing further cases on
reverse-payment settlements. The robust use of Article 102
to counter late life cycle management strategies in Servier
may signal increased enforcement activity with regard to
issues such as product hopping in the context of generic
entry. Pricing is likely to continue to be a focus of enforce-
ment activity. While the European Commission does not
seem inclined to intervene as it sees pricing in this sector
as primarily a national issue, it would not be surprising to
see continued activity at the national level in light of the
increasing concern over the impact of high-priced drugs
on national healthcare budgets. Enforcement efforts may
also reflect technological trends, such as the emergence of
biologics and the increasingly close relationship between
pharmaceutical products and medical devices.
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60 See Notification 2015/144/PL, Private members’ draft Act on the
Amendment of the Pharmaceutical Act and certain other Acts.
61 See Response of the European Commission to Parliamentary Question P-
006245/2015 (3 June 2015).
62 ‘Sector inquiry on vaccines for human use’, ICA, Ref. IC50, 27 May 2015.
63 ‘Lithuanian authority analyses reimbursable drug market’, MLex (19 May
2015).
64 Danish Competition and Consumer Authority, Press Release, 7 September
2015.
65 CNMC, Study of the market for the retail distribution of medicines in Spain,
E/CNMC/003/15 (15 October 2015).
66 ‘Poland’s Competition Authority Completes Analysis of Retail
Pharmaceutical Market’, Polish Office of Competition and Consumer
Protection Press Release (21 May 2015).
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